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Numerous legal scholars have addressed the question of whether regu-
latory competition is a race to the bottom, to the top, or in some other direc-
tion. This literature has focused on both international and domestic
regulatory competition, but has not attempted to analyze, for particular inci-
dents of regulatory competition, the interplay between international and
domestic regulatory competition.
Single-stock futures provide an excellent opportunity for such analysis.
Single-stock futures are obligations to buy or sell individual stocks at a
specified time and price. For example, the purchaser of a $100 December
* Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
'See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities
Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2384 n.76 (1998) (offering race-to-the-top interpretation);
Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation,
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able Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L.
REv. 903 (1998) (arguing for regulatory competition among national securities law regimes);
James D. Cox, Choice of Law Rules for International Securities, 66 U. GIN. L. REv. 1179
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2002 futures contract on IBM stock is obligated to buy IBM stock for $100
at a specified date during December 2002. The purchaser of a single-stock
futures contract will make money if the price of the stock increases during
the relevant period; the seller will lose money. From a purely financial per-
spective, single-stock futures behave much like ordinary stocks.
However, single-stock futures differ from ordinary stocks in several re-
spects, the most important of which is regulatory. In the U.S., single-stock
futures had been illegal for nearly two decades, until December 15, 2000,
when Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act
("CFMA"). The CFMA lifted the ban on trading of single-stock futures,
single-stock futures are likely to begin trading soon on U.S. exchanges. '
Outside the U.S., single-stock futures were legalized only recently in many
jurisdictions, and are subject to varying regulatory frameworks. For exam-
ple, seven exchanges traded single-stock futures last year, including ex-
changes in Hong Kong, Sydney, and Mexico, and other exchanges recently
have approved trading of such futures.4
The competition for regulation of single-stock futures has evolved in
three stages, beginning in the U.S. and then spreading internationally. This
article attempts to make some sense of these stages of regulation, and to use
the example of single-stock futures as a framework for contributing to the
academic debate about regulatory competition. For the past two decades,
there has been a variety of forms of regulatory competition related to single-
stock futures. In recent months, that competition is changing focus, from
competition within or between particular countries to competition among
international joint ventures of domestic regulators. This change in focus
provides the motivation for the theories developed here.
2 Single-stock futures contracts can be thought of as leveraged positions in the underlying
stock, depending on the underlying margin requirements. See infra Part III.A.
3 Trading will be authorized among institutional invesiors in the U.S. by August 2001 and
by individual investors in the U.S. by December 2001. See Joseph Weber, Caution: Single-
Stock Futures Ahead, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 38. Congress passed the CFMA just
hours before adjourning for the session, with no comment or debate. Prior hearings on the
CFMA had not addressed many important policy issues, and the last-minute approval of the
bill during the controversy surrounding the Presidential election precluded any further con-
siderations of policy. See Frank Partnoy, Stock Gambling on the Cheap, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec.
21, 2000, at A39. The CFMA also exempted swaps from regulation, thereby cemented some
long-standing attempts by financial market participants to insulate a large portion of the de-
rivatives market from regulation, and is a good example of intrajurisdictional and interjuris-
dictional regulatory competition. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission granted a
regulatory exemption for swaps just before President Clinton took office in 1993, and in the
CFMA Congress essentially made that exemption law. However, the swaps amendments
have not created (and probably will not create) multinational regulatory competition, so the
focus of this article is on the single-stock futures amendments.
4 See, Exchange Traded and OTC Derivatives: Make or Break for Chicago, FINANCIAL
NEWS, Feb. 5, 2001, at 2
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This article argues that regulatory competition is not monolithic and
can take at least three very different forms. The regulation of single-stock
futures has evolved through all three stages of these forms.
The first form of regulatory competition involves "intrajurisdictional
regulatory competition," or competition within a jurisdiction among alterna-
tive regulators. Regulatory competition related to single-stock futures be-
gan in context of intrajurisdictional regulatory competition: namely, a
dispute within the U.S. federal jurisdiction between the Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") and Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC").
The second form involves "interjurisdictional regulatory competition,"
or competition among regulators in different jurisdictions. In recent years,
this form of regulatory competition has dominated with respect to single-
stock futures. While the U.S. regulatory regime was embroiled in a costly
turf battle, several European regulators and exchanges, as well as the self-
regulated private over-the-counter market, began competing with the costly
U.S. regulatory regime.
Whereas these first two forms of regulatory competition are well
documented and covered in the legal literature, the third form - which I call
"multinational regulatory competition" - is newer and more difficult to
characterize. Accordingly, any claims about future regulatory competition
in this form necessarily are speculative. By "multinational regulatory com-
petition," I mean competition occurring when a group of regulators from
more than one sovereign forms a partnership as a multinational regulator
and then seeks to compete with other groups of regulators, also formed
from more than one sovereign. There is some recent empirical evidence
that regulatory trends in market for single-stock futures are in the direction
of multinational regulatory competition.
Multinational regulatory competition may be an attractive alternative
to other forms of regulatory competition. As discussed in greater detail be-
low, intrajurisdictional competition is subject to costly and inefficient turf
battles over regulatory market power. Interjurisdictional competition is not
subject to those same problems, but is likely to generate other costs and in-
efficiencies, as parties engage in territory-related regulatory arbitrage trans-
actions, which are - at best - normatively indeterminate. Multinational
competition - which involves competition between partners of regulators of
different countries, and therefore captures both intranational and interna-
tional competition - may be more likely to create race-to-the-top condi-
tions.
Part II describes this new framework for analyzing theories of regula-
tory competition (including the notion of multinational regulatory competi-
tion), and applies the framework to the regulation of single-stock futures.
5 See infra Part III.
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Part III discusses several policy issues related to the regulation of single-
stock futures, and attempts to address whether or how multinational regula-
tory competition with respect single-stock futures might be a more efficient
regulatory regime than other structures.
In particular, Part III expands the discussion to focus on more general
international regulatory issues relevant to single-stock futures. The three
preliminary conclusions are: (1) single-stock futures will introduce oppor-
tunities for substantial leveraging of individual stock transactions in ways
that previously were not available; (2) single-stock futures will shift the fo-
cus of securities fraud regulation in numerous areas, including insider trad-
ing and market manipulation, and (3) single-stock futures will allow
investors to avoid costly restrictions on short sales, which should improve
market efficiency. On balance, single-stock futures have the potential to
make markets fairer and more efficient, and multinational regulatory com-
petition is one likely method of encouraging such improvements.
I1. REGULATORY COMPETITION AND SINGLE-STOCK FUTURES
Regulatory competition can occur in several different ways. First,
regulators within a particular jurisdiction can compete. For example, regu-
lators in the financial markets frequently have overlapping jurisdiction. The
regulation of single-stock futures has been an example of this type of com-
petition.
Before December 2000, the SEC and CFTC competed over regulation
of single-stock futures for nearly two decades.6 Originally, the SEC
claimed it should have jurisdiction because single-stock futures behave like
the underlying individual stocks and bonds; the CFTC claimed it should
have jurisdiction because such single-stock futures behave like futures. The
result was stalemate, and a Congressional ban of trading of single-stock fu-
tures. Similar forms of competition have occurred in other areas.7
I refer to this type of regulatory competition as "intrajurisdictional
regulatory competition." Intrajurisdictional regulatory competition is
unlikely to be efficient for several reasons. First, absent other forms of
competition, intrajurisdictional competition is likely to consist simply of
participants in an oligopolistic regulatory regime (in the case of single-stock
futures, a duopoly). Each regulator has market power; the only question is
whether one regulator will achieve monopoly power. Accordingly, each
regulator has incentives to expend resources to capture these rents, and no
regulator faces competition from outside the regulatory regime.
6 In many ways, such competition will continue under the cooperative regime envisioned
by the CFMA.
7 Obvious examples include competition among banking regulators and between the Fed-




Second, an oligopolistic regulatory regime imposes duplicative costs.
Parties must either comply with multiple regulator requirements, or estab-
lish why only one set of requirements is relevant. The existence of over-
lapping regulatory jurisdiction creates confusion among market
participants. Such cost and confusion was a major reason why the British
financial market regulator is now a single entity.
A second form of regulatory competition is "interjurisdictional regula-
tory competition." For example, corporations in the U.S. choose among the
several states in deciding whether to incorporate. Because there is only one
incorporation option within a particular state, there is no intrajurisdictional
regulatory competition. Instead, state monopolist regulators compete with
each other. The deadweight losses associate with individual state monopo-
lies are mitigated by competition among monopolists.
Interjurisdictional regulatory competition can take on many forms.
State regulators can compete with federal regulators. National regulators
can compete with each other. National regulators can compete with supra-
national regulators.
nterjurisdictional regulatory competition is likely to create benefits in-
trajurisdictional regulatory competition does not. The market power of
regulators is limited by the presence of competition outside of the monop-
oly structure. Therefore, the consequence of a regulator having monopoly
power is mitigated. Much of the debate among legal academics has focused
on the potential costs and benefits of interjurisdictional regulatory competi-
tion, and that debate need not be rehashed here.
A third form of regulatory competition - which, to my knowledge, has
not received the attention of legal scholars - is "multinational regulatory
competition." Multinational regulatory competition occurs when a group of
regulators from more than one sovereign forms a partnership as a multina-
tional regulator and then competes with other groups of regulators, also
formed from more than one sovereign. Figure 1 describes the various pos-
sibilities.
Figure 1
Sovereign A Sovereign B
Regulator Al Regulator B 1
Regulator A2 Regulator B2
Intrajurisdictional regulatory competition involves competition be-
tween Regulator Al and Regulator A2, or between Regulator B 1 and Regu-
lator B2. Interjurisdictional regulatory competition involves competition
between one regulator from Sovereign A (e.g., Regulator Al) and one regu-
lator from Sovereign B (e.g., Regulator B 1). Multinational regulatory com-
petition involves competition between Partnership 1, formed by Regulator
Al and Regulatory Bl, and Partnership 2, formed by Regulatory A2 and
Regulator B2.
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Multinational regulatory competition is likely to have additional bene-
fits not associated with other forms of regulatory competition. It avoids the
costs and inefficiencies associated with intrajurisdictional regulatory com-
petition, for the same reason interjurisdictional regulatory competition
avoids those costs: regulators with market power are subject to competition
from outside their jurisdiction.
Moreover, multinational regulatory competition adds a layer of compe-
tition not existent under interjurisdictional regulatory competition. Individ-
ual actors can choose among regulatory choices, just as they do under
interjurisdictional competition, and individual regulators are subject to
competitive forces, as they ideally would be under a functionally operating
system of intrajurisdictional competition. Accordingly, scholars might find
multinational regulatory competition to be an attractive alternative to inter-
jurisdictional competition, regardless of their position with respect to the
race-to-the-top vs. race-to-the-bottom debate.
Whereas interjurisdictional regulatory competition is appropriately
characterized as a linear race (either to the bottom or to the top), multina-
tional regulatory jurisdiction is more complex, dynamic, and non-linear.
There are two layers of competition - from outside a particular sovereign
and from within the sovereign - and these layers move in opposite direc-
tions. Moreover, the two layers of competition interact, creating second or-
der effects from the effects of interjurisdictional competition on
intrajurisdictional competition (and vice versa). In addition, there is likely
to be higher-level competition between the partnerships of multinational
regulatory regimes.
Perhaps more importantly, there are not the same incentives for parties
to engage in regulatory arbitrage transactions as existed under interjurisdic-
tional competition, because parties within a particular jurisdiction are not
subject solely to that jurisdiction rules. In other words, there is no need for
transactions within a particular sovereign to move "offshore." Accordingly,
multinational regulatory competition should capture the benefits of inter-
jurisdictional competition while avoiding some of the costs.
Single-stock futures are an excellent example of this transition from in-
trajurisdictional regulatory competition to interjurisdictional regulatory
competition and (potentially) to multinational regulatory competition. As
noted above, Congress approved of the use of single-stock futures on De-
cember 15, 2000. This approval followed two decades of intrajurisdictional
and interjurisdictional regulatory competition. First, the SEC and CFTC
competed over jurisdiction. This competition was costly and inefficient,
and the only resolution to the dispute was a Congressional ban on futures
Multinational Regulatory Competition
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contracts on individual stocks and bonds. For more than a decade, options
on single securities were allowed; futures on single securities were not.9
It is difficult to argue that domestic regulatory competition (i.e., be-
tween the SEC and CFTC) was efficient. In fact, competition between the
two regulators led to a stalemate that precluded any change in regulation,
and was best described as a nasty turf battle.
Second, interjurisdictional competition from outside the U.S. put pres-
sure on the U.S. ban on single-stock futures. As is often the case in finan-
cial markets, participants responded to costly regulation by engaging in
regulatory arbitrage transactionsW° to create economically equivalent posi-
tions not subject to the regulatory costs. This process of regulatory arbi-
trage can occur though interjurisdictional competition.
In this instance, the regulatory cost imposed on single-stock futures
trading in the U.S. was very high, because such instruments were illegal.
As a consequently, market participants who wished to obtain the exposure
associated with a futures or forward position in an individual stock opted
out of the U.S. securities regulatory structure and traded over-the-counter
derivatives transactions, both inside and outside the U.S. Examples of such
transactions include not only single-stock futures on non-U.S. exchanges,
but a wide variety of equity derivative products, including equity swaps and
over-the-counter options and options combination strategies. The norma-
tive consequences of such international competition are indeterminate. On
one hand, market participants were able to reduce transactions costs and en-
ter into transactions they otherwise would not have been able to enter.11 On
the other hand, to the extent U.S. regulations were beneficial, regulatory ar-
bitrage likely eroded those benefits.
The third stage of this evolution of regulatory competition is multina-
tional regulatory competition. The question is whether competition in the
regulation of single-stock futures will move in this direction. There already
is some evidence that competition is becoming multinational.
On March 26, 2001, the London International Financial Futures and
Options Exchange (Liffe) and the National Association of Securities Deal-
8 Section 4(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act provides that it is unlawful to enter into a
commodity futures contract that is not made "on or subject to the rules of a board of trade
which has been designated by the Commission as a 'contract market' for such commodity."
7 U.S.C. § 6(a).
9 See Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. SEC, 187 F.3d 713, 716 (7th Cir. 1999)
(noting that "[t]his allocation appears to be a political compromise; no one has suggested an
economic rationale for the distinction."). Over time, exceptions were carved out of this ban
for futures on government securities, including U.S. Treasury bonds, and for futures on
broad-based equity indices, including the Standard & Poor's 500 Index.
1o Regulatory arbitrage is defined as transacting to avoid regulatory costs.
" Peter H. Huang has argued that the use of derivatives to create additional transaction
opportunities is normatively indeterminate. Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New
Financially Engineered Derivatives, 73 S. CAL. L. REv. 471,498-500 (2000).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 21:641 (2001)
ers Automated Quotation System (Nasdaq) announced a partnership to offer
single-stock futures within both the U.S. and Europe. 12 The partnership will
trade single-stock futures through an existing electronic system based in
London, called Liffe Connect, which previously had offered single-stock
futures based on several dozen U.S. stocks to investors outside the U.S. 13
Presumably, the Liffe-Nasdaq partnership will lead to similar cross-border
partnerships. Competition between these cross-border partnerships is the
essence of the idea of multinational regulatory competition.
One need not look far to find examples of some limited pressure to-
wards multinational regulatory competition in other areas in the financial
markets. Just as corporations have accrued benefits from multinational
status, other financial market entities have sought to expand beyond their
domestic structure. There is no reason in principle why regulators cannot
enjoy the same multinational benefits corporations long have enjoyed, and
there is some evidence that regulators under this notion. For example, stock
markets compete generally for trading in securities. American Depositary
Receipts and Global Depositary Receipts allow investors in one jurisdiction
to invest in securities in another jurisdiction. U.S. and European derivatives
exchanges also have cooperated for many years. Admittedly, many of these
examples have involved self-regulatory organizations with substantial mar-
ket power within their jurisdiction (e.g., stocks that trade only on the New
York Stock Exchange in the U.S. and the London Stock Exchange in Eng-
land), and therefore do not generate the degree of competition envisioned
by multinational regulatory competition. By contrast, single-stock futures
are the most recent - and perhaps the best - example of how multiple cross-
border regulatory partnerships can evolve and compete in multiple jurisdic-
tions.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF SINGLE-STOCK FUTURES REGULATION
The regulatory competition debate as it relates to single-stock futures is
not merely theoretical. The type of regulatory competition influences sev-
eral policy issues relevant to financial market participants. The discussion
below focuses on three of those issues: margin requirements, securities
fraud, and short positions. 14
12 See Nikki Tait & Aline Van Duyn, Liffe and Nasdaq Form Derivatives Link: Joint
Venture Aims to Develop Market for Futures on Individual Stocks, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27,
2001, at 23. The partnership will be subject to U.S. regulation.
13 See Paul Armstrong, Liffe and Nasdaq Derivative Link Hits LSE, LONDON TIMES, Mar.
27, 2001, at #. Single-stock futures were not immediately successful in London: only 36,370
contracts traded during the second week of trading, and one prominent U.S. academic pro-
nounced the contracts "dead on arrival." See Joseph Weber, Caution: Single-Stock Futures
Ahead, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 26, 2001, at 38 (quoting Professor Robert E. Whaley).
14 Portions of Part III are drawn from Frank Partnoy Some Policy Implications of Single-




One of the factors driving support for the CFMA was the high margin
requirements associated with purchasing and selling stock. In general,
margin requirements for futures are much less than they are for stocks. In-
vestors in single securities in the cash markets are subject to a margin re-
quirement of 50 percent.1 s In contrast, futures transactions typically require
margin of only a few percent.
16
The CFMA amends Section 7 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
to provide that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall
prescribe the margin requirement applicable to trading of single-stock fu-
tures.17 However, the CFMA also provides that the Federal Reserve is per-
mitted to delegate its authority to the Securities Exchange Commission and
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, who then jointly would prescribe
the applicable margin requirements.' Although there are no explicit lower
boundary constraints on appropriate margin requirements, there is a sugges-
tion in the statute that initial and maintenance margin requirements should
be consistent with the margin requirements for comparable option con-
tracts.
19
It seems clear that both initial and maintenance margin requirements
for single-stock futures will be less than 50 percent. The question remains
how much less. Some observers have predicted that levels will settle in the
20 percent range, still much higher than comparable levels for other futures;
others are lobbying for lower requirements.2 In any event the margin re-
quirements seem likely to fall in some intermediate range, based on the
form and amount of regulatory competition.
What are the implications of this intermediate range? First, to the ex-
tent margin requirements for single-stock futures are lower than require-
ments for stock, investors are likely to use single-stock futures as a less
costly vehicle for leveraged speculation in individual companies. The im-
pact most likely will be strongest on individual investors. For many years,
wealthy investors and institutions have had access to other types of deriva-
tives transactions, including equity swaps, enabling them to take leveraged
positions in individual shares of stock while avoiding the 50 percent margin
requirement of Regulation T.
Whether lower margin requirements make sense depends in part on the
actions of individual investors, and whether those actions will generate
15 See Federal Reserve Reg. T.
16 See Exchange Traded and OTC Derivatives: Make or Break for Chicago, FINANCIAL
NEws, Feb. 5,2001, at 2 (citing "the 1% to 3% that is usual on futures in the U.S.").
17 See CFMA § 206(b)(1).
See CFMA § 206(b)(2).
See CFMA § 206(b)(2)(B)(iii).
20 See Exchange Traded and OTC Derivatives: Make or Break for Chicago, FINANCIAL
NEws, Feb. 5, 2001, at 2
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negative externalities. The relevant question is how additional speculation
from unsophisticated traders will affect the safety and soundness of mar-
kets. The risk is that markets will be more volatile and that volatility will
increase as stock prices decline, because investor margin calls on a given
day will be triggered much more quickly.
Second, there will be ongoing pressure for regulators to push the mar-
gin requirements down as low as possible, in part to compete with the op-
tions markets, but also to compete with single-stock futures markets outside
the U.S. Proponents of lower margin requirements argue that single-stock
futures will not be viable unless their margin requirements are lower than
those for corresponding options.2'
Theoretically, it is correct that options can be used to construct syn-
thetic cash or forward positions in single stocks. However, the transaction
costs of replicating a single-stock futures position using options are high. A
simple long position in a stock requires not only two options transactions
(the purchase of a call and the sale of a put) but also a lending transaction.
Moreover, to create a position that is economically equivalent to a long po-
sition in a stock, the exercise prices of the call and put must equal the cur-
rent price of the stock, and the loan must be in an amount equal to the
present value of the exercise price. Single-stock options do not trade for
every exercise price (they typically trade in increments of $5), and liquidity
at any particular exercise price can be limited. Accordingly, high transac-
tion costs preclude the use of options to replicate long stock or futures posi-
tions, especially in small trading lots, and therefore single-stock futures will
be an attractive alternative to options even at higher margin requirements.
In addition, the CFMA permits the SEC and CFTC to permit trading of op-
tions on single-stock futures as of December 15, 2003.2
Third, the level of margin requirements will affect how management of
particular companies will think about their shareholder base. Today, if the
stock of a company drops precipitously in one day, the stock price can enter
into a death spiral as investors receive margin calls. The possibility of an
individual stock meltdown increases as the margin requirements decrease.
For example, a company about to announce that it will miss an earnings es-
timate is much more likely to have its stock face downward price pressure if
the margin requirement is substantially lower.
The CFMA envisions that regulators adopting margin requirements for
single-stock futures will consider issues such as preserving the financial in-
tegrity of markets and preventing systemic risk.23 If the regulators take
these admonitions seriously, margin requirements should be set at an ap-
21 Some attorneys already have begun making this argument with respect to the margin
requirements of the CFMA. See Futures on Single Stocks May Face High Hurdles,
BuSINss DAY (THAILAND), Feb. 13, 2001, at 1.
22 See CFMA § 251(a)(2).
23 See CFMA § 206(b).
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propriate level. Again, this is where the type of regulatory competition will
play a significant role. Interjurisdictional regulatory competition alone
might be a race to the lowest available margin requirement, because inves-
tors prefer a reduction in this requirement and will engage in regulatory ar-
bitrage transactions to reduce their margin costs. It is unclear whether this
race would be to the top or bottom, although there is a risk of negative ex-
temalities resulting from regulatory arbitrage. The alternative of multina-
tional regulatory competition might provide some comfort that parties
would not simply transact to minimize margin requirements. Moreover,
multinational regulatory competition would result in an equilibrium margin
level within the relevant jurisdictions, so that each jurisdiction would retain
some control over these transactions, or at least information about these
transactions.
B. Securities Fraud
The CFMA anticipates a wide range of securities fraud-related prob-
lems associated with single-stock futures by incorporating these new in-
struments into the existing securities regulation framework. For example, a
single-stock future is defined as a "security future" and is included within
the definitions of security in the Securities Act of 193324 and in the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.25 Accordingly, absent an exemption, the securi-
ties laws generally apply to single-stock futures.
The CFMA explicitly contemplates the notion that individuals might
engage in insider trading or market manipulation through the use of single-
stock futures. In fact, single-stock futures are a natural vehicle for such ac-
tivities. Because of the lower margin requirements and the greater potential
to evade detection, single-stock futures might be a popular choice among
insider traders. Just as insider traders began purchasing call options instead
of stock in recent years, one can expect them to begin buying single-stock
futures once those securities are available. Likewise, stock markets and fu-
tures markets are linked by various arbitrage transactions and parity condi-
tions, and the introduction of single-stock futures will create additional
opportunities for manipulation in both sets of markets.
The CFMA amends the insider trading portions of the securities laws
to cover single-stock futures. For example, the CFMA amends Section
20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act (which prohibits trading of derivatives
when trading of the underlying stock would constitute a violation) to in-
24 See CFMA § 208(a)(1)(A). The CFMA also exempts certain single-stock futures from
registration and reporting requirements. See CFMA § 208(b).
' See CFMA § 201(a)(l)-(5). The CFMA also covers any "narrow-based security in-
dex," which includes stock indices with a relatively small number of stocks. See CFMA §
201(a)(5).
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clude single-stock futures.26 Similarly, the CFMA amends Section 16(b) to
include transactions in single-stock futures among its trading prohibitions. 7
Likewise, the CFMA amends the market manipulation sections of the
securities laws to include single-stock futures. For example, the act amends
the Section 9(b) prohibition against manipulation to include single-stock fu-
tures.
2 8
Consequently, it seems clear that anyone engaging in insider trading or
market manipulation through the use of single-stock futures will be violat-
ing the securities laws to the same extent they would have if they had traded
the underlying stock. As a policy matter, this result might be correct, but it
does not allow for the possibility (and consequently the benefits) of regula-
tory competition. In other words, parties cannot currently opt out the secu-
rities fraud regime as it applies to single-stock futures. In addition, the
application of the various securities laws to the trading of single-stock fu-
tures leaves several questions unanswered.
First, to what extent are fiduciary duties owed to holders of single-
stock futures? What if a company's stock is closely held by insiders and
the company obtains external financing through the use of single-stock fu-
tures? For example, suppose the value of a company is $1 million and all
of the stock is held by insiders. The insiders sell long futures positions to
investors, who agree to buy all of the stock in the company in one year for
$1.1 million.
In this scenario, to whom should management owe fiduciary duties?
The insider shareholders of the company have been transformed into deb-
tholders, who typically are not entitled to such duties. To see this, consider
that as long as the company has value of at least $1.1 million, the insiders
will receive $1.1 million in one year (i.e., 10 percent interest plus return of
principal). However, if the company has value of less than $1.1 million in
one year, the insiders will suffer all of the losses. Thus, the insiders have
become debtholders: they own a one-year bond with a 10 percent coupon
and limited upside.
In contrast, the investors in futures have become the true (i.e., eco-
nomic) shareholders of the company. They will capture any of the in-
creases in the value of the company above $1.1 million. Accordingly, there
is a strong argument that management should owe a duty to such investors.
Yet, traditionally, duties are owed to shareholders, not to holders of single-
stock futures.
26 See CFMA § 205(a)(3). Similarly, the CFMA includes single-stock futures in Section
21A(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, which provides for liability for contemporaneous
traders for insider trading. See CFMA § 205(a)(4).
27 See CFMA § 208(b)(3).
28 See CFMA § 205(a)(1).
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Second, which single-stock futures traders are covered by the securities
laws? Section 20(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, as amended by the
CFMA, provides that trading single-stock futures will constitute insider
trading whenever "purchasing or selling a security" would constitute insider
trading. Has an insider who sells security futures when the insider pos-
sesses positive information engaged in insider trading? In other words, is
there a violation when the prohibited cash transaction under Section 20(d)
would have been apurchase of the underlying stock?
Third, how should single-stock futures be treated for other regulatory
purposes? Equity derivatives of various types are popular in part because
of the differential regulatory treatment they receive. Parties often engage in
regulatory arbitrage transactions where economically equivalent transac-
tions are treated differently from a tax, accounting, or other regulatory per-
spective.29 Just as parties have used equity swaps, short-against-the-box,
and various options transactions to receive a portion of the gain from an ap-
preciated stock position without paying tax or recognizing gain, parties un-
doubtedly will use single-stock futures for such purposes, too.
In sum, the application of securities fraud regulation to single-stock fu-
tures does not contemplate much regulatory competition. 0 One obvious
reason for concern about interjurisdiction regulatory competition in this
area is the facilitation of regulatory arbitrage transactions, which might ren-
der the U.S. securities fraud regime irrelevant. Some scholars would ap-
plaud this result. Nevertheless, whatever one's view of the current U.S.
securities fraud regime, multinational regulatory competition would be
more likely to result in an equilibrium level of regulation that would not en-
courage such regulatory arbitrage transactions. Instead, each jurisdiction
would retain partial control over the regulatory structure, and the competi-
tive dynamic would ensure that no regulator retained substantial market
power.
C. Short Positions
Single-stock futures might make markets more efficient for stocks
whose value is influenced by the difficulty of selling that stock short. In a
short sale, an investor borrows shares from a broker and sells them. If the
price of the stock drops, the investor makes money because she can buy
cheaper shares to satisfy the borrowing. If the price of the stock rises, the
investor loses money because she remains obligated to satisfy the borrow-
ing with more expensive stock.
29 See Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J.
Corn L. 211 (1997).
30 Any residual intrajurisdictional competition between the SEC and CFTC is unlikely to
generate benefits.
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Various rules and restrictions apply to investors shorting stock. For
example, investors can sell short only following an uptick (or zero uptick)
in the price of the stock (i.e., when the most recent transaction was at a
higher price than the previous transaction). The "uptick rule" was designed
to prevent steep market declines associated with sequential short sales.
Whether or not it achieves its purpose, it imposes a significant cost on
shorting. In addition, it frequently is difficult for investors to borrow a
large number of shares, because the shares available for shorting transac-
tions are only a fraction of the total outstanding shares. Investors also face
the same 50 percent margin requirement for shorting that they face for pur-
chasing stock. All of these restrictions increase the cost of shorting.
Single-stock futures might provide a benefit by offering a less restric-
tive market for selling short. The benefits could be substantial. A liquid
market in single-stock futures might prevent certain financial market
anomalies caused, at least in part, by restrictions on shorting.
For example, consider the "parent-subsidiary" valuation anomaly. In-
credibly, some parent company's shareholdings of subsidiaries recently
have had lower valuations than the shares of the subsidiaries themselves.
For example, for several months after 3Com. publicly issued a portion of its
holdings of Palm, a previously wholly-owned subsidiary, the shares of Palm
retained by 3Corn were worth substantially less than the shares of Palm
traded in the market.31
One might think this gap would be closed by arbitrage, with investors
buying the cheap Palm shares through purchases of 3Corn stock and selling
short the more expensive Palm shares in the market. Yet notwithstanding
very substantial trading volumes in both stocks, the gap persisted. In fact,
the gap persisted even after the companies announced a firm date and an
exchange ratio for the spin-off of all of 3Com's remaining ownership of
Palm. One explanation for this puzzling anomaly (and for others like it) is
that it was very difficult and costly to sell short Palm stock during this pe-
riod, both because of applicable regulations and because of the difficulty of
borrowing actual Palm shares.
If this explanation is correct, the trading of single-stock futures might
ameliorate this anomaly, both by enabling investors to avoid regulations
applicable to short sales and by creating a virtually unlimited supply of
short futures positions for investors. In fact, 3Corn and Palm both at-
tempted to resolve the anomaly by allowing the trading of "when-issued"
versions of the 3Corn and Palm shares, which closely resemble a form of
single-stock futures.32
31 Frank Partnoy, Strange New Math of Palm Inc., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000, at A29.
32 The shares traded under a separate ticker symbol and entitled the holder to one share of
the company after the spin-off was completed. For example, when issued shares of 3Com,
with ticker symbol COMS, traded under the ticker symbol COMSV, and entitled the holder
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By enabling investors to sell short stock in a less costly manner, the
CFMA might eliminate some of these market inefficiencies. Investors
would be better off to the extent market prices are made more accurate, so if
a market for shorting single-stock futures helps to make prices more accu-
rate, the CFMA could create substantial benefits.
In this instance, either interjurisdictional regulatory competition or
multinational regulatory competition likely would yield the relevant bene-
fits. The major difference between the two regimes is that although inter-
jurisdictional regulatory competition enables parties to avoid restrictions on
shorting by moving transactions outside of the jurisdiction, multinational
jurisdictional competition enables parties to avoid the restrictions by choos-
ing among competing regimes within multiple jurisdictions. In addition,
multinational jurisdictional competition has the added benefit of competi-
tion within particular jursidictions, which might prove substantial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Whether regulatory competition results in a race-to-the-top or a race-
to-the-bottom is a difficult question. This article has hinted at two issues
that might help legal scholars interested in answers. First, regulatory com-
petition comes in many shapes and sizes. I propose a tripartite framework
for considering the various forms of regulatory competition. Intrajurisdic-
tional competition is least likely to yield benefits - and may not ever reach
any equilibrium - because regulators retain market power and are subject to
dysfunctional incentives. Interjurisdictional competition is likely to reach
some equilibrium point, although such a result can be normatively indeter-
minate. In any event, interjurisdictional competition poses the risk that
market participants will use regulatory arbitrage transactions to avoid par-
ticular jurisdictions. Multinational regulatory competition is an attractive
alternative, because it ensures several modes of competition while preserv-
ing the possibility that every jurisdiction will retain partial oversight of
relevant transactions.
Second, recent changes in the regulation of single-stock futures are an
excellent experiment to watch for those interested in testing various theories
of regulatory competition. Single-stock futures have been subject to each
of the above three forms of regulatory competition, with differing effects,
and may be the first regime to enjoy dynamic multinational regulatory
competition. There are numerous policy concerns related to single-stock
futures, and those policy concerns depend greatly on the type of regulatory
competition. Multinational regulatory competition should ameliorate some
of those concerns.
to one share of 3Com after the spin-off was complete (i.e., to one share of 3Com, ex-Palm).
Likewise Palm shares traded under the ticker symbol PALMV.
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